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Abstract
We adapt Yeaple￿ s (2005) heterogeneous agents framework to model ￿rms in the
North as making explicit o⁄shore outsourcing decisions to cheap-labor economies.
Globalization results from a lowering of the set-up costs incurred when engaging in
o⁄shore activities. We highlight how ￿rms￿technology transformations due to global-
ization will induce skill upgrading in the North, increase aggregate productivity, av-
erage wages and therefore total welfare at the cost of increased wage inequalities. We
analytically derive mild conditions under which all consumers￿ including lower-skilled
workers￿ will nevertheless gain from the surge of o⁄shore outsourcing. A parameter-
ized version of the model roughly calibrated on U.S. data is then numerically explored
and con￿rms our positive welfare predictions.
Keywords: O⁄shore outsourcing; Globalization; Skill upgrading, Technology upgrading;
Firm heterogeneity
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Recent revolutionary advances in transportation and communication technologies coupled
with institutional progress in many cheap labor countries have provided ￿rms in the North
with strong new incentives to extensively adopt o⁄shore outsourcing strategies and transfer
larger parts of their production activities to the South. Though the transferred activities
are bound to be dominantly low-tech manufacturing shifting the demand for production
workers at home, some low-skilled white collar jobs that were previously protected from
foreign competition are now threatened by this new factor-cost savings prospect. This
is a rather new phenomenon in international trade. For this reason, the prospect of
massive o⁄shoring in white collar services and its potential consequences on welfare in the
North has surged as a major political issue in the previous US presidential campaign. As
convincingly argued by Mankiw and Swagel (2006), the extent of outsourcing to low-wage
countries is currently less than one might infer from media reports, and the idea that U.S.
￿rms are shipping products back to the United States and disrupting the U.S. labor market
simply does not line up with the data. But the phenomenon is recent, and possibly not yet
perceptible in the data: in view of the new international environment, it is hard to exclude
the possibility that ￿rms in the North could massively turn multinational and switch to
cost-saving o⁄shore outsourcing practices, transferring large parts of their labor-intensive
activities to the South. Assuming this does happen, and that U.S. ￿rms start shipping
products back to the United States, will that disrupt U.S. labor markets?
Addressing this issue, Mankiw and Swagel (2006) note that, though there exists a
large theoretical literature on the positive aspects of o⁄shore outsourcing focusing on the
factors in￿ uencing ￿rms￿choices of organizational structure and location of production,
relatively little normative analysis is available on the welfare impact of o⁄shoring. Most
existing papers tend to suggest that o⁄shore outsourcing is a modern form of trade, and
that it will therefore almost inevitably imply that there are winners and losers￿ the curse
of Stolper-Samuelson￿ but that the gains from the ￿rst are large enough to compensate for
the latter.1 Our paper contributes to qualify this perception: o⁄shoring need not lead to
lower welfare for domestic factors competing with foreign factors. The argument is that,
1See Deardor⁄ (2005, 2006) for an illuminating discussion on this.
2by making pro￿table expensive-to-set-up but cheap-to-operate technologies, globalization
induces domestic-only ￿rms to turn multinational and switch to more e¢ cient technolo-
gies and hence induces a potentially large subset of workers in the North to relocate to
more productive activities. There is ample evidence that this mechanism is of empirical
relevance. Indeed, it is well established that multinationals use better technologies and
are therefore more e¢ cient than their purely domestic competitors. Furthermore, Head
and Ries (2002) have investigated the in￿ uence of o⁄shore production by Japanese mul-
tinationals on domestic skill intensity, using ￿rm-level data. They ￿nd that additional
foreign a¢ liate employment in low income countries raises skill intensity at home, but
that this e⁄ect falls as investment shifts towards high income countries. This is clearly
consistent with vertical specialization, and provides evidence that vertical specialization
by multinationals contributes to skill upgrading domestically.2
To model this mechanism, we adapt Yeaple (2005) to a North-South setting: workers
are heterogeneous in their absolute and comparative advantages in di⁄erent technolo-
gies and ￿rms are ex ante identical but endogenously adopt di⁄erent technologies. Two
complementary activities within a ￿rm, which we refer to as ￿repetitive￿ and ￿concep-
tual￿enter in the production process, respectively of ￿intermediates￿and ￿headquarter
services￿ ; these tasks may be separated geographically: conceptual tasks are exclusively
performed in the North while the South can produce the intermediates at lower cost than
the North. Headquarter services can be produced via a high ￿xed-cost low marginal-cost
technology or from a low ￿xed-cost high marginal-cost technology. Workers sort into pro-
duction activities in equilibrium. The ablest workers produce headquarter services and
the less able intermediate goods. Among non-production workers employed in headquarter
services, the most able use the high-￿xed cost technology. Since o⁄shoring involves a ￿xed
cost, a ￿rm must have su¢ ciently large sales volumes for this activity to increase pro￿ts.
Hence, only those ￿rms that choose the high ￿xed-cost low marginal-cost technology in-
2Hansson (2005) reaches similar conclusions on Swedish MNEs during the years 1990-97. The period
is particularly interesting because it covers the years after the iron curtain was lifted: Swedish MNEs
have extensively taken advantage of the large supply of cheap labor in the immediate neighborhood which
the processes of transition in the CEECs has given rise to. He ￿nds a non-trivial, signi￿cantly positive,
impact on skill upgrading in Swedish MNE parents of the increased employment share in their a¢ liates in
non-OECD countries.
3vest abroad, substituting cheap foreign labor for domestic labor in the production of the
intermediates. Globalization is interpreted as a reduction in the ￿xed cost of o⁄shoring.
We demonstrate that this inevitably induces some ￿rms to adopt better technologies and
some workers to skill upgrade, in particular among blue-collars, who move to less repet-
itive more e¢ cient activities. This rise in the economy￿ s global productivity can bene￿t
the least paid factor owners. Furthermore, the consecutive market size increase makes a
greater variety of products available to consumers, in particular to the less-skilled.3 We
show that, under mild conditions, real wages rise even at the low-end of the skill ladder.
We next proceed to explore numerically a parameterized version of the model roughly
calibrated on U.S. data and show that our theoretical results indeed bear some realism:
globalization generates positive welfare gains for all.
We are obviously not the ￿rst to reach such a conclusion, though we use a very di⁄erent
approach. An early paper by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) develops a Heckscher-Ohlin
type model without factor-price equalization. They then show that outsourcing leads to
a productivity increase for ￿rms which will lower the prices for ￿nal goods; this reduction
in consumer prices, they stress, could exceed the fall in wages of the less-skilled workers.
More recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a, b) also demonstrate that, depending
on demand parameters, productivity growth induced by increased o⁄shoring opportunities
can bene￿t the factor intensely used in the sector with decreasing o⁄shoring costs. An
innovative aspect of their analysis is to focus, in a perfectly competitive environment, on
the nature of tasks performed on the job; this, they advocate, is more relevant for a job￿ s
propensity to be o⁄shored than either the skill-intensity of the occupation or the education
level of the worker. The conceptual shift may prove extremely important (in particular
for empirical investigations, see e.g., Becker et al. (2008)) but complexi￿es the theoretical
analysis.4 In contrast with the previous authors, we acknowledge the role of increasing
returns to scale and make imperfect competition an indispensable ingredient in the shaping
of the new global economy.5 Furthermore, we explicitly consider the e⁄ect of globalization
3See Broda and Weinstein (2006) for an empirical investigation of the gains from trade for the U.S. due
to the worldwide expansion of available varieties of goods.
4The result also hinges on an assumption on technical progress that raises questions: see Taylor (2006).
5Even though we focus on o⁄shore outsourcing, our model could be seen as closely related to the
traditional vertical FDI literature. See Helpman (1984) and Markusen (2002, Ch.9) for modeling of vertical
4on four ￿rm-level decisions: entry, technology choice, whether or not to o⁄shore outsource
and the type of workers to employ so that we account for the observed fact that, to
take advantage of the new low-cost opportunities, some ￿rms upgrade technologically.6
Our model remains nevertheless extremely simple and the results quite intuitive. As we
shall argue in the paper, the highlighted characteristics of ￿rms that engage in o⁄shore
outsourcing is consistent with empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is laid down in Section 2, and the e⁄ects
of globalization are analyzed in Section 3. Numerical results are reported in Section 4
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with ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿).
Domestic households also supply labor from a continuum of workers with unit mass,
di⁄erentiated by skill level z with cumulative distribution G(z) on support [0;1).
2.2 Firms
Each ￿nal-good variety is produced by a single ￿rm. Output x(i) of any variety requires
combining two type of activities within a ￿rm: we refer to the ￿rst as conceptual activities
MNEs under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition.
6See e.g., Navaretti et al. (2006) for a discussion on technological upgrading related to ￿rms switching
from national to multinational.
5associated with headquarter services, and to the second as repetitive tasks associated with
the production of intermediate components, respectively in amount y(i) and m(i). These
tasks may be separated geographically. We assume a Leontief production function with
units chosen so that:
x(i) = y(i) = m(i): (4)
Both activities are performed by workers using Ricardian technologies. Headquarter ser-
vices can only be produced in the home country, the North, using a high- (H) or a low- (L)
technology. Technology H is more expensive to set-up but cheaper to operate than L so
that FL < FH and CL > CH, where Fj and Cj denote respectively the set-up and marginal
costs involved by the use of technology j = L;H. Though born identical, ￿rms will sort
in equilibrium between these two types: this is one source of endogenously generated ￿rm
heterogeneity.
Firms also choose where to produce their intermediate goods: domestically with an
M technology, at marginal cost CM, or in the South where unit production cost ￿CM is
lower: ￿ < 1. O⁄shore outsourcing however involves speci￿c set-up costs FI so that only
the most productive ￿rms will turn multinational. There is considerable evidence that
multinational (MN) ￿rms use more productive technologies than non-MNs,7 so we choose
FI and ￿ such that only ￿rms using the H technology ￿nd it pro￿table to o⁄shore outsource
the production of their intermediate inputs. (The conditions for this to be satis￿ed will
be given later.) We de￿ne for future use ￿j = 1;￿ for j = L;H.
Finally, ￿rms di⁄er from one another by the skill level of the domestic workers they hire.
Let ’j(z) denote the productivity of a worker of skill z when working with technology j 2
fM;L;Hg. We assume ’j(z) continuous and increasing in z, so that, for any technology
considered, a higher skilled worker is absolutely more productive than a less skilled one.

















7It is widely documented that a¢ liates of multinationals are more productive than national ￿rms; see
for example Doms and Jensen (1998), Conyon et al. (2002). In addition, Helpman et al. (2004) highlight
also that MNEs are substantially more productive than non-MNE exporters which outperform signi￿cantly
purely domestic ones.
6with ’M(0) = ’L(0) = ’H(0) = 1, so that a higher skilled worker is relatively more
productive with more e¢ cient technologies. In equilibrium, workers will sort between the
three technology types according to their respective comparative advantage.8 Let z1 and
z2 be equilibrium skill thresholds with 0 < z1 < z2. Then, the least skilled with z 2 [0;z1]
will be employed to perform repetitive tasks, whereas the intermediate (with z 2 [z1;z2])
and most talented (with z 2 [z2;1)) workers will be hired to perform conceptual activities
in headquarters, respectively with low- and high-tech. See Figure 1.9
Log of
productivity
1 z 2 z
L n   () M z j
L n   () L z j
L n   () H z j
z
Figure 1: The technologies
In a competitive labor market, worker z earns a wage w(z) that re￿ ects both its talent




> > > <
> > > :
CM’M(z) 0 ￿ z ￿ z1
CL’L(z) z1 ￿ z ￿ z2
CH’H(z) z2 ￿ z
(6)
8For ease of exposition, we assume in what follows that all three types of technologies are used in
equilibrium.
9We assume in this ￿gure a log-linear form for the productivity functions ’j(z), though this is not the
only functional form that satis￿es condition (5).




as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The wage distribution
CM is chosen as numeraire; the two indi⁄erence conditions therefore pin down the










Observe from (5) that CL and CH are decreasing respectively in z1 and z2.
We are not interested in unrealistically extreme cost di⁄erences between North and
South in manufacturing10, and shall restrict our attention to cases where
CH < CL < ￿CM < CM: (9)
10See I.L.O. (2007) for unit labor cost comparisons.
8Empirical evidence on the level of the ￿xed costs is scarce but it seams reasonable to
assume that the total ￿xed costs of a vertically fragmented ￿rm is less than twice the ￿xed
costs of a domestic ￿rm:
(CH + ￿CM)(FH + FI) < 2(CL + CM)FL (10)
where for convenience, ￿xed costs take the form of unsold ￿nal goods.
Multinationals and non-multinationals compete on the output market. We assume
monopolistic competition to prevail so that ￿rms charge a constant mark-up rate over




(Cj + ￿jCM) j = L;H: (11)
2.3 Equilibrium











pjxj = (Cj + ￿jCM) ￿ (Fj + ￿jFI) j = L;H (13)
with ￿j = f0;1g for j 2 fL;Hg.
Finally, we ensure balance of payment equilibrium by conveniently assuming that labor
costs in the South are paid by multinationals in units of the consumption basket (1).















with PXX = Inc + Inc￿, which completes the model.11
11We have assumed that FI and ￿ are such that only high-tech ￿rms engage in o⁄shore outsourcing.
To exclude the possibility for a low-tech ￿rm to turn multinational requires that the mark-up revenue it




















X, using respectively (11) and (2).
93 Globalization
We now analyze the e⁄ects on the home country of globalization which we shall quite
naturally interpret as a fall in FI, making o⁄shore outsourcing increasingly attractive.
3.1 The wage distribution
We start by showing how the cut-o⁄ skill levels z1 and z2 are a⁄ected by globalization.







an expression that is unambiguously positive so that z1 and z2 move in the same dir-
ection.12 The reason is transparent: less labor used domestically for repetitive tasks
(dz1 < 0) can only imply a contraction of aggregate activity by non multinationals
(dz2 < 0) and, therefore, an expansion of total employment in multinational ￿rms. Con-





(CH + ￿CM) ￿ (FH + FI)
(CL + CM) ￿ FL











We learn from this equality that the equilibrium marginal-cost gap between MNs and













From our characterization (5) of technologies and the fact that, see (16), z1 and z2 move
in the same direction, it is easy to check that the only possibility is for both CH and CL to
increase, the ￿rst more than the second as the two cut-o⁄skill levels move leftward. Glob-
alization therefore a⁄ects the equilibrium wage distribution in this economy as illustrated
in Figure 3.














L n  () wz
Figure 3: Wage distribution shift as FI decreases
Two qualitatively di⁄erent skill-upgrading mechanisms operate as aggregate employ-
ment in non-MNs contracts. Firstly, workers with abilities z 2 (z0
1;z1) , initially employed
by domestic-only ￿rms at repetitive tasks are moved to more productive conceptual activ-
ities within the same ￿rm type and therefore earn better wages. All the more talented
domestic workers (those with z > z1) bene￿t from this increased demand for skills and
see their wages rise, as is apparent from the equal log-rise of marginal costs CL and CH
(respectively to C0
L and C0
H). Secondly, the best workers in the non-MN ￿rms￿ those with
11z 2 (z0
2;z2)￿ move to high-tech jobs within multinationals and earn more, their new wages
matching their improved productivity. All those with talent levels above z2 bene￿t from
this, their skill premium rising equally as re￿ ected by the log-increase of the marginal
production costs within multinationals from C0
H to C00
H. In this economy, globalization
unambiguously rises overall productivity, average wages, as well as wage inequalities.
Observe that, even though average wages decline in the low-skill activities, this is only
a composition e⁄ect: for individual workers who remain in blue-collar jobs, wages remain
unchanged in terms of the numeraire.
3.2 Individual ￿rm behavior and industry concentration
We ￿rst consider non-multinational ￿rms. It immediately follows from mark-up pricing
(11) and free entry (13) that the individual non-MN￿ s supply of ￿nal goods is proportional
to ￿xed costs (expressed in real terms) and therefore remains constant: xL = (￿￿1)FL. We
know from the leftward move of z1, and from the technology, that aggregate blue-collar
employment, and therefore aggregate output, of non-multinationals decrease. As one
would have expected, fewer ￿rms will survive to globalization without transferring their
blue-collar activities to cheap labor countries. We know that those ￿rms that survive do
so by increasing the price of their output, skill upgrading some of their blue-collar workers
to more conceptual tasks for which they earn better wages.
Consider next multinationals. We know from the previous discussion that the in-
dividual MN￿ s output scale is una⁄ected by changes in marginal costs ￿ since xH =
(￿ ￿ 1)(FH + FI)￿ and that smaller ￿xed costs reduce the equilibrium ￿rm size. We
also know that the skill threshold z2 moves left which implies that the aggregate output of
MNs increases. It therefore follows that the number of ￿rms that outsource o⁄shore has
unambiguously increased. Clearly, globalization has induced a number of national ￿rms to
turn multinational, adopting the H-technology, skill upgrading their workers z 2 (z0
2;z2),
operating at larger scale and selling ￿nal goods at cheaper prices than their purely domestic
competitors.
Hence, globalization implies both creation and destruction of ￿rms. We now show that
the net e⁄ect on the total number of ￿rms is positive. From (1) and our de￿nition of ￿xed
12costs in units of the ￿rm￿ s unsold ￿nal good, we have:
Z 1
z2
’H(z)dG(z) = NH (xH + FH + FI)
= NH ￿ (FH + FI) (19)
Z z1
0
’M(z)dG(z) = NL ￿FL
where Nj denotes the equilibrium number of type-j ￿rms. Totally di⁄erentiating N =































Our assumptions (9) and (10) on technologies ensure that the term in brackets is al-
ways negative. We conclude that the number of product varieties available to consumers
increases unambiguously.
3.3 Welfare
We know from Figure 4 that all workers see their wages increase in terms of the numeraire
except those who remain attached to their blue-collar jobs within non-MN ￿rms. It is
shown in Appendix 1 that the purchasing power of the average wage increases unam-
biguously, so that would be losers ￿ the low-skilled￿could always be compensated for by
transfers from those who bene￿t from the new international environment.
We are more interested in the conditions under which lower-skilled workers will bene￿t
from globalization even in absence of redistributive policies. For this purpose, we need
focus our attention on the consumption price index (3) only. We have shown that, because
of higher wages paid to workers with skill z > z0
1, dCH > dCL > 0 so that, from (11), both
pL and pH increase: this ￿distribution e⁄ect￿acts negatively on the welfare of those that
remain in blue-collar activities.
A number of domestic ￿rms, however, turn multinational and produce intermediates
with cheaper labor: for this subset of ￿rms, the total e⁄ect on output prices is uncertain










L+CM < 1 where superscripts 0=1 refer to the ￿rm￿ s pre- and
post-mutation variables respectively. Using (9), we know that C1
H + ￿CM < 2￿ so that
p1
H < p0
L if ￿ <
C0
L+CM
2 , that is, if international wage disparities of low-skilled labor is not
too small, presumably the case that concerns us most. This ￿selection e⁄ect￿works to
everyone￿ s bene￿t, in particular to the less-skilled.
Finally, globalization has a positive e⁄ect on the size of the market, which by making
available a larger number of product varieties contributes positively to welfare. We infer
from Krugman (1981) that the more ￿nal goods are di⁄erentiated, the more it is likely
that market-size expansion gain will outweigh the distribution loss: the ￿selection e⁄ect￿
contributes to make this requirement on preferences less stringent, and the positive welfare
outcome more likely: see Appendix 2 for an expression that relates PX to ￿.
To conclude, we have shown that in this economy, the surge of o⁄shore outsourcing
needs not inevitably induce losers: even workers employed in activities that are most
easily moved o⁄shore may gain.13 How realistic are the conditions for these welfare gains
to materialize? We address this question in the next section by exploring numerically a
parametrized version of the model roughly calibrated on US data.
13Our model abstracts from labor market adjustments in the South. Endogenizing wages in the
South would only mitigate the welfare conclusions. To see this, consider the extreme case of inelastic
labor supply abroad: as FI decreases, wages in the South ￿ and therefore ￿￿ adjust upward constrain-
ing the aggregate volume of o⁄shore production by MN ￿rms to remain constant. z1 and z2 remain
unchanged: there is no skill upgrading and no ￿selection e⁄ect￿ on welfare. From (11) we know that
dpH > 0 and from (19) that dNH > 0: we have nothing more than the standard opposition between
a ￿distribution loss￿ and a ￿market-size expansion gain￿ . In this speci￿c case, it is easy to see that
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z2 ’H(z)dG(z)[CL + CM]
￿￿ [CH + ￿CM]
i 1
1￿￿ : As FI is
reduced, everything remains constant in the RHS except ￿ that rises: PX therefore unambiguously falls.
144 A numerical appraisal
4.1 Calibration
In this section, we use a calibrated version of the model to assess some orders of magnitude
and sensitivity with respect to key parameters.
I.L.O. (2007) provides us with unit labor costs (relative to U.S.) in manufacturing for
a number of cheap labor countries, from which we choose
￿ = 0:82 , (21)
a value between those of Mexico and of the new EU Member States (Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland) in year 2002.
From Industry Statistics published by the U.S. Census Bureau (2002, Table 5, p.54)
we choose
z1 = 70% , (22)
as the ratio of the number of production workers to the total number of employees in
Manufacturing in year 2002; from the same source, we pick the share of non-production
activities in total value added from labor as:
CL
R z2





0 ’M(z)dG(z) + CL
R z2
z1 ’L(z)dG(z) + CH
R 1
z2 ’H(z)dG(z)
= 42% ; (23)
we approximate the share of total production that is due to MN ￿rms as the output share







= 14% . (24)
We have little guidance from empirical evidence on the ￿xed costs, which we choose some-
what arbitrarily within the ranges consistent with the constraints:14
FL = 1:0; FH = 1:186; FI = 0:75 . (25)
14In addition to constraints mentioned in a previous footnote, the theoretical consistency of the model
imposes that: (a) some L-type ￿rms exist, so that
1
￿pLxL ￿ (CL + CM)FL; (b) all H-type ￿rms adopt
o⁄shore outsourcing strategies so that
1



















X, using respectively (11) and (2). The value of FH is






H = (CH + CM)FH.
15We assume log-linear technologies (consistently with our graphical representations in pre-
vious sections) and a uniform distribution of talents G(z). Finally, we set
￿ = 4 (26)
as the benchmark value for the di⁄erentiation elasticity in preferences.
With this set of functional forms and parameter values, it is straightforward to calibrate
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Figure 4: The three techologies
4.2 Welfare e⁄ects of globalization for alternative values of ￿
Figure 5 reports the e⁄ect of globalization ￿ measured on the horizontal axis by the level
of the ￿xed cost of o⁄shoring FI￿on the consumption price index PX. Computations are
reported for various values of the di⁄erentiation elasticity ￿, and con￿rm our theoretical
analysis.16 We see that for realistic values of ￿ (i.e. for values not too di⁄erent from 4)
15Appendix 3 reports the calibrated benchmark equilibrium values.
16Changing the values of ￿ obviously implies recalibrating the model. Doing this, we maintain conditions
(22) to (24) and the values of FL and FI unchanged so as to keep z2 and the marginal costs CM, CL,
CH unchanged; the two cost parameters that are a⁄ected are ￿ and FH. To ￿ 2 [3;8] are associated







(CH + CM)FH, as explained in footnote (14). See Appendix 3 for more information on which of the
equilibrium variables are una⁄ected by changes in ￿.



























Figure 5: Impact of globalization on PX (sensitivity w.r. to ￿)
17How much of these results is due to the selection e⁄ect, and how much to the market-size expansion
e⁄ect? We can get a rough idea of this by computing from (19) the impact on NH of a reduction of FI
keeping z2 constant, and comparing this with the equilibrium number of new MNs. In all the performed
simulations, this ratio is below 10%.
175 Conclusion
It is widely believed both in academic and in policy circles, that globalization and massive
o⁄shore outsourcing to cheap labor countries will bene￿t some￿ mainly high-skilled￿
workers within the North, at the expense of the others. Yet, up to now, empirical invest-
igation fails to provide evidence in support of this view.18 Furthermore, in a country￿
Japan￿ where o⁄shore outsourcing has been extensively practiced for decades, there seems
to be strong evidence that vertical specialization by local multinationals has induced
skill upgrading domestically (Head and Ries, 2002) with blue-collar workers being moved
to more productive white-collar jobs within the same ￿rms. This observed e¢ ciency-
improving reallocation of factors suggests that globalization need not be associated with
falling real wages at the low-end of the skill ladder. Based on Yeaple (2005), we have
developed a simple general equilibrium model with endogenously induced heterogeneity
of ￿rms from exogenously heterogeneous labor; these ￿rms make explicit decisions on
whether or not to fragment geographically their production so as to take advantage of
favorable cost-conditions o⁄shore. As globalization proceeds, making increasingly prof-
itable the displacement of manufacturing activities to low-cost countries, workers in the
North are endogenously moved to less repetitive more productive tasks. We have shown
analytically that, under mild conditions, real wages will rise even at the low-end of the
skill ladder. Numerical exploration of the model roughly calibrated on U.S. data con￿rms
that those conditions are far from being unrealistic. The basic mechanism, technology
upgrading at the individual ￿rm level and skill upgrading of workers, is simple enough to
be plain to, and deemed reasonable by, any citizen. Yet, the implications are unlikely to
be easily understood by non economists because they hinge on general equilibrium e⁄ects
that are far more abstract. We believe that the simplicity of the model will render those
powerful GE e⁄ects transparent enough so that our paper will contribute to change the
perception that globalization is a threat rather than an opportunity for all.
Needless to say, the model abstracts from important elements of the real world such
18There is ample evidence highlighting how globalization has increased wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled workers; see Feenstra and Hanson (2003) for an excellent survey on this literature. However,
as Feenstra (2007) argues, so far there is no evidence that real wages of unskilled (production) workers are
negatively impacted by outsourcing.
18as labor market imperfections: introducing rigidities could presumably inverse the conclu-
sions.19 But then the policy implication would clearly be that government action has to
aim at reducing those imperfections, not at opposing to globalization as is often sugges-
ted:20 more rigid labor markets can only enhance the attractiveness to ￿rms of o⁄shore
options. Rather than thwarting adjustment, public action should aim at protecting work-
ers rather than jobs: this, in particular, calls for extensive and ￿ exible re-training programs
that could indeed be costly to set-up. But it is clear that such public action would in any
case stand as a top priority even in absence of globalization, in view of the ongoing aging
of populations in the North.
19See Davidson et al. (2008) for an analysis that includes heterogeneous labor and search; they reach a
very di⁄erent conclusion.
20During his run for U.S. president, John Kerry, for instance, forcefully suggested changing the U.S. tax
code to discourage o⁄shore outsourcing practices by U.S. ￿rms!
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21Appendix 1:
E⁄ect of globalization on the average wage











making use of (12), w becomes:












NL(CL + CM)1￿￿ + NH(CH + ￿CM)1￿￿￿ 1
1￿￿ (29)


















0 ’M(z)dG(z)(CL + CM)1￿￿ + 1
￿(FH+FI)
R 1




Di⁄erentiating the RHS of this expression with respect to z2, and making use of (8), (16),
(17) and (19) yields:
dRHS(30)
dz2
= w￿￿2 ￿ ￿CM ￿ (31)
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+ (￿ ￿ 1) N2
















dz2 < 0 and dz1




dz2 < 0 that
is, globalization unambiguously improves aggregate welfare.
22Appendix 2:
E⁄ect of globalization on price of aggregate consumption PX















Totally di⁄erentiating the RHS of (32) with respect to z2 and making use of (8), we obtain:
dRHS(32)
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R 1







With (19) and (8) , the ￿rst bracket-term simpli￿es to:















which, making use of (17) simpli￿es further to:














From (16) and (8), dz1


































(CL + CM)￿￿’H(z2)dG(z2): (35)
















Finally, making use of (34), (35) and (36) to rearrange (33), we obtain:
dRHS(32)































dz1 < 0 and that dz1





dz2 < 0, the second term will be negative if ￿ is not too large. The impact of
globalization on PX will therefore be negative only if there is enough product di⁄erenti-
ation, that is, if ￿ is small enough.
24Appendix 3:
Calibrated initial equilibrium (for alternative values of ￿ )




0.750 0.727 0.704 0.681 0.657
q 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.820
H F 1.186 1.186 1.186 1.186 1.186
L F 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 z 0.700 0.655 0.612 0.569 0.528
2 z 0.969 0.920 0.871 0.823 0.776
M C 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
L C 0.632 0.651 0.670 0.689 0.708
H C 0.564 0.584 0.605 0.625 0.646
L p 2.176 2.202 2.227 2.252 2.277
H p 1.845 1.872 1.899 1.927 1.954
L x 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
H x 5.808 5.739 5.669 5.600 5.530
L N 0.241 0.220 0.202 0.184 0.168
H N 0.020 0.051 0.079 0.106 0.131
Inc 1.659 1.682 1.708 1.737 1.768
X P 3.352 3.279 3.225 3.186 3.158
25I F
3 s =
0.750 0.727 0.704 0.681 0.657
q 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757
H F 1.136 1.136 1.136 1.136 1.136
L F 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 z 0.700 0.650 0.601 0.554 0.509
2 z 0.969 0.914 0.860 0.806 0.752
M C 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
L C 0.632 0.653 0.675 0.696 0.717
H C 0.564 0.587 0.610 0.633 0.656
L p 2.448 2.480 2.512 2.543 2.575
H p 1.982 2.015 2.050 2.084 2.119
L x 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
H x 3.773 3.727 3.680 3.634 3.588
L N 0.321 0.291 0.263 0.237 0.213
H N 0.028 0.074 0.117 0.157 0.195
Inc 1.659 1.685 1.714 1.748 1.784
X P 4.064 3.908 3.793 3.706 3.640
I F
6 s =
0.750 0.727 0.704 0.681 0.657
q 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885
H F 1.292 1.292 1.292 1.292 1.292
L F 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 z 0.700 0.664 0.628 0.594 0.561
2 z 0.969 0.929 0.890 0.851 0.813
M C 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
L C 0.632 0.648 0.663 0.678 0.693
H C 0.564 0.581 0.597 0.613 0.629
L p 1.959 1.977 1.995 2.013 2.031
H p 1.739 1.759 1.778 1.798 1.817
L x 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000
H x 10.208 10.092 9.976 9.861 9.745
L N 0.160 0.149 0.139 0.129 0.120
H N 0.013 0.029 0.043 0.057 0.071
Inc 1.659 1.677 1.697 1.719 1.743
X P 2.749 2.726 2.711 2.700 2.694
26I F
8 s =
0.750 0.727 0.704 0.681 0.657
q 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919
H F 1.407 1.407 1.407 1.407 1.407
L F 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 z 0.700 0.670 0.641 0.613 0.585
2 z 0.969 0.936 0.904 0.872 0.841
M C 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
L C 0.632 0.645 0.657 0.670 0.682
H C 0.564 0.578 0.591 0.604 0.618
L p 1.866 1.880 1.894 1.908 1.922
H p 1.695 1.710 1.725 1.740 1.756
L x 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000
H x 15.096 14.934 14.772 14.610 14.448
L N 0.120 0.114 0.107 0.101 0.095
H N 0.009 0.018 0.027 0.036 0.044
Inc 1.659 1.674 1.690 1.707 1.725
X P 2.475 2.467 2.463 2.461 2.461
27